Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Day 1 (Tuesday 19 April) @ 16:00 – 17:00 Beeger lecture
The Right to Deny
Plausible deniability seems like the ultimate get-out-of-jail-free card. But how can we make it work when it comes to digital information sent in a public network?
Deniable encryption, defined by Canetti et al (Crypto 1997), suggests a method to achieve deniability by the sender of encrypted messages to overcome this problem. The idea is especially interesting in the context of electronic elections to eliminate the threat of vote buying after a vote has been cast, except that the encryption scheme is not homomorphic, which is necessary for encrypted vote adding, and it achieves only a 1/poly probability of being able to successfully deny unless the ciphertexts are not compact.
I will present two new works on the subject. In the first we define and construct sender Deniable Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) polynomial hardness assumption. Deniable FHE enables storing encrypted data in the cloud to be processed securely without decryption, maintaining deniability of the encrypted data, as well the prevention of vote-buying in electronic voting schemes where encrypted votes can be tallied without decryption. The construction achieves compact ciphertext independently of the level of deniability. Both the size of the public key and the size of the ciphertexts are bounded by a fixed polynomial, independent of the detection probability achieved by the scheme. However, the offline running time of our encryption algorithm depends on the inverse of the detection probability. Thus, the scheme falls short of achieving simultaneously compactness, negligible deniability and polynomial encryption time. The online running time is polynomial. In another work, more recently, we show a sender deniable encryption scheme where the encryption scheme is a quantum algorithm but the ciphertext is classical, which is secure under the LWE polynomial hardness assumption. This scheme achieves for the first time simultaneously compactness, negligible deniability and polynomial encryption time under LWE. Furthermore, it is possible to extend the scheme so that coercion in an election cannot take place when the coercer is able to dictate all inputs to the deniable encryption algorithm even prior to encryption.
Shafi Goldwasser is Director of the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, and Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of California Berkeley. Goldwasser is also Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT and Professor of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics at the Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel. Goldwasser holds a B.S. Applied Mathematics from Carnegie Mellon University (1979), and M.S. and Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California Berkeley (1984).
Goldwasser’s pioneering contributions include the introduction of probabilistic encryption, interactive zero knowledge protocols, elliptic curve primality testings, hardness of approximation proofs for combinatorial problems, and combinatorial property testing.
Goldwasser was the recipient of the ACM Turing Award in 2012, the Gödel Prize in 1993 and in 2001, the ACM Grace Murray Hopper Award in 1996, the RSA Award in Mathematics in 1998, the ACM Athena Award for Women in Computer Science in 2008, the Benjamin Franklin Medal in 2010, the IEEE Emanuel R. Piore Award in 2011, the Simons Foundation Investigator Award in 2012, and the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award in 2018. Goldwasser is a member of the NAS, NAE, AAAS, the Russian Academy of Science, the Israeli Academy of Science, and the London Royal Mathematical Society. Goldwasser holds honorary degrees from Ben Gurion University, Bar Ilan University, Carnegie Mellon University, Haifa University, University of Oxford, and the University of Waterloo, and has received the UC Berkeley Distinguished Alumnus Award and the Barnard College Medal of Distinction.